By Seyfeddin Kara

When Israel’s then President Ezer Weizman, a former air force chief, visited Turkey in 1997 he violated diplomatic protocol by making statements about the host country’s internal affairs. Commenting on the Welfare Party’s victory in the elections he said “the Turkish army will not stay idle following [Necmettin] Erbakan’s inauguration as Prime Minister.”  Contrary to what would have been expected from any sovereign country faced with such gross interference in its internal affairs, Weizman received a very mild reaction. The Turkish Foreign Ministry played down the Israeli President’s remarks, calling them Weizman’s personal opinion.

   Compared to those days one may understand Israeli dismay regarding the current harsh rhetoric of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tajib Erdogan. A once unwavering ally of Israel in the region, Turkey has now become vociferously critical of Israel.

   However, the harsh rhetoric of Erdogan does not only anger Israeli policy makers, it also puzzles the Ummah. Muslims around the world cannot make sense of the cooperation between the two countries, continuing despite the political vendetta between Israeli leaders and Erdogan. The Ummah wants to believe that Turkey has departed from its pro-Israeli stance and returned to its Islamic roots, once again embracing the Islamic world and becoming the protector of Muslims as their ancestors the great Ottomans did.

   There are many incidents that create confusion in the Ummah. Last January, Israel’s Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Danny Ayalon publicly insulted Turkish ambassador Oguz Celikkol over a scene, aired in a Turkish TV show, Valley of the Wolves. Israeli humiliation of the ambassador offended Turkish pride and drew harsh criticism from Turkish politicians and the media. However, three days after the crisis, Israel’s Defence Minister Ehud Barak received a warm welcome from Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmed Davudoglu and both politicians acted as if nothing happened in their meeting.

   In another development, on December 18, 2009, Turkish President Abdullah Gul and his Israeli counterpart, Shimon Peres, agreed to mend relations, to make them “positive and stable”. However, three days later, at a joint press conference with Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri, Erdogan slammed Israel for violating Lebanon’s airspace and for its air strike in Gaza. How is it possible that on the one hand Turkey voices strong criticism of Israel and on the other talks about “positive and stable” relations? What is the reason for this ambivalent relationship between the two countries?

   Relations between Turkey and Israel began in March 1949 with Turkey’s recognition of Israel. Initially Turkey’s secular elites were very cautious about the creation of Israel as they could not figure out how this new development would affect them. The relationship between the two developed gradually and had to go through several crises related to Arab-Israeli relations.

   The first major crisis erupted in November 1956 during the Suez Crisis. The Turkish government withdrew its ambassador from Israel in response to the joint Israeli, French and British attack on Egypt. The Turkish government also announced that its ambassador would not return to his post until Israel complied with the UN resolution. Other crises took place during the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars. Turkey again downgraded its relations.

   These crises did not occur because of Turkey’s concerns for the rights of the Palestinians or international law. The dominant power in the formulation of Turkish foreign policy, since the creation of the Turkish Republic, has been the Kemalist elites who were obsessed with maintaining their totalitarian regime. Due to lack of popular support, the Kemalist elites believed that the only way to remain in power was to steer clear of any military conflict with neighbouring countries. This was formulated in the words of Mustafa Kemal as “Peace at Home, Peace in the World”. This formula shaped the principle of Turkish foreign policy. Kemalist elites felt threatened by the belligerent nature of Israel and therefore preferred to have stable relations with Arab neighbours.

   In this regard, although Turkey became a NATO member in 1951 and a satellite state of the US in the Middle East region, Ankara did not fully comply with the US agenda in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Turkish policy makers felt so insecure due to their alienating secular policies that they did not want to upset the Soviets or the Arabs.

   However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the geopolitical landscape of the region changed dramatically. Turkey had the second largest army of NATO members and was considered crucial for the defence of Europe. The Kemal-ist elites were concerned that Turkey’s importance to the Western alliance would diminish as there was no Soviet threat anymore. The policy makers knew well that it would be difficult to maintain the Kemalist regime without external support, especially at a time when the regime was facing two imminent “threats”:  Kurdish rebellion and “Islamic radicalism”.

   The Kemalist elites needed the support of the only remaining “superpower”, the US, and they believed that Israel was the key to securing such support. Hence, they put emphasis on the “threat” from the “Islamists” as it had particular significance for the new approach in their foreign policy. This would place Turkey on the anti-Iranian axis along with the US and Israel, thus securing their support.

   The US lent strong support to Turkish-Israeli rapprochement. The strong relations between the two were crucial for the new US Middle East order as well as world hegemony. Turkey and Israel, two powerful countries in the region, could be useful for containing the “Iranian threat” and controlling Arab countries.

   Turkey initiated the alliance with Israel. The two architects of the “strategic relations” were then Undersecretary of Foreign Ministry Onur Oymen and Deputy Chief of Staff Cevik Bir, a notorious general and the most powerful figure in Turkish politics at the time. They believed in the importance of political and military cooperation with the sole secular country of the region, Israel, which maintained “Western values and democratic principles”.

   Then Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Ciller visited Israel in November 1994 and described relations between the two countries as “special”. During her visit an intelligence agreement was signed. The crucial point came when President Suleyman Demirel visited Israel in March 1996 and signed a number of agreements including those on military and economic cooperation, free trade and joint investments.

   The relationship reached its acme when Necmettin Erbakan’s Refah (Welfare) Party gained the majority of seats in the National Assembly in 1996. As the worst nightmares of the Kemalist elites came true, they felt more insecure and intensified their efforts to strengthen ties between Turkey and Israel. With the support of Israel and the US, the Turkish army removed in 1997 the coalition government led by Erbakan in a post-modern military coup d’état.

   The situation ostensibly changed in 2002 when AKP, the Islamic-rooted party, came to power in Turkey. Although there was no immediate change in relations, the first blow came in 2004. Erdogan was outraged at the Israeli assassination of Hamas leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, and called it a “terrorist act”. He also described the Israeli policy in the Gaza Strip as “state-sponsored terrorism”.

   These reactions did not change the nature of relations as Israeli politicians have always appreciated the importance of a strong Muslim ally in the region. Similarly, Turks have considered Israel as a useful means to secure US support, a policy the AKP leaders have not abandoned; of course strong US influence keeps the relations intact.

   This dynamic was clearly demonstrated in 2006 when Erdogan sharpened his criticism of Israel and refused to meet some Israeli officials. In turn, US President George Bush refused to meet Erdogan until he had visited Israel. Thus, the US reminded Erdogan that if Turkey wished to receive continued US support, he needed to keep its relations with Israel intact.

   Since then Erdogan has not dared to cross the red lines that the US drew for Turkey’s foreign policy. Despite the popular demand of the Turkish public, he did not break or even downgrade Turkey’s relations with Israel. His harsh rhetoric was rather a careful move to satisfy the demands of the Turkish public who have strong sympathy for the Palestinians. At best it could be said that Erdogan’s Islamist roots have somewhat emotionally attached him to the Palestinian cause.

   More importantly, Erdogan has aimed to increase Turkey’s regional prestige. As part of its ambitious “neo-Ottomanist” foreign policy concept Turkey is trying to develop independent policies in the region and pursue them with the aim to become the dominant regional power. The perimeters of the new independent policy are however, clearly dictated by protecting US interests. Taking advantage of the current lukewarm relations between the Obama administration and the present Israeli government, Erdogan finds it easier to criticize Israel than he might otherwise do.

   However, until the Turkish government is ready to confront the US, a dramatic change in Turkey’s approach to Israeli relations or the Palestinian issue cannot be expected. Unfortunately, such a confrontation is far beyond the horizons of Turkish politics at present.